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MANAGING SENSITIVE ECOSYSTEMS: HONSINGER V.
STATE AND THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN THE
RULES OF REAL PROPERTY
I. INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Supreme Court's holding in Honsinger v. State, ' be-
nign on its face, adopts a rule of real property which unnecessarily
interferes with the state's ability to manage its resources. At issue in
Honsinger was the ownership of approximately ninety-five acres of
land that had emerged contiguous to the littoral side of Honsinger's
property. Under traditional principles of accretion and reliction,2
principles which were applied by the Honsinger court,3 title to newly
emerged land vests in the former riparian owner.4 Yet, application
Copyright © 1984 by Alaska Law Review.
1. 642 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1982).
2. "Accretion" is the process by which solid material is deposited in such a
manner as to cause that which had been covered by water to become dry land. This
new land emerges contiguous to the original shoreline. See, e.g., 5A G. THOMPSON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 2560 (J. Grimes ed.
1978); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 19 (5th ed. 1979).
"Reliction" occurs by the withdrawal of water from the shoreline leaving land
exposed that was previously submerged. See, e.g., G. THOMPSON, supra, § 2563;
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1161 (5th ed. 1979).
3. 642 P.2d at 1354.
4. The doctrines of accretion and reliction are essentially interchangeable:
under either rule the former riparian owner acquires title to the newly formed land.
See, e.g., Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 325 (1973); Hughes v. Wash-
ington, 389 U.S. 290, 293 (1967). See generally 7 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY 983 (P. Rohan ed. 1982); G. THOMPSON, supra note 2, §§ 2560 & 2563.
Alaska adheres to the traditional doctrines of reliction and accretion. See Depart-
ment of Natural Resources v. Pankratz, 538 P.2d 984, 991 (Alaska 1975); Schafer v.
Schnabel, 494 P.2d 802, 806-07 (Alaska 1972); Waynor v. Diboff, 9 Alaska 230 (D.
Alaska 1937).
A "riparian" owner is technically defined as "one who owns land on [the] bank
of [a] river." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1192 (5th ed. 1979). One who owns land
bordering on an ocean, sea, or lake is properly regarded as a "littoral" owner. Id at
842. Despite this technical distinction, the term "riparian" is often used by courts
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of these common law rules need not have been automatic in
Honsinger because the newly formed land was alleged to have re-
sulted from a process known as glacio-isostatic uplift;5 prior to
Honsinger, no case in any jurisdiction had considered whether
glacio-isostatic uplift is a form of either accretion or reliction.
If the court had concluded that glacio-isostatic uplift is not a
type of accretion or reliction, it could have applied equitable princi-
ples to determine in which party, the state or private owner, title to
glacio-isostatic uplifted lands should vest. Hence, rather than neces-
sarily vesting ownership in the former riparian owner, the court
could have balanced the interest of the state in obtaining ownership
- effective management of its shorelines - with the interest of the
former riparian owner in obtaining ownership - retaining the ripa-
rian feature of one's land.6 The glacio-isostatic process would have
thus served as an escape device from the inflexible doctrines of ac-
cretion and reliction. By holding that land uplifted by glacio-iso-
static forces is a form of reliction, and accordingly that the property
vests in the former riparian owner, the court failed to capitalize on
this escape route. In effect, it has adopted a rule which ignores the
state's interest in these lands, thereby adversely affecting Alaska's
management of its delicate resources.
This note is divided into two sections. The first section will ex-
amine the weaknesses in the Honsinger court's reasoning. The sec-
ond section discusses an alternative approach which the court could
have adopted.
and commentators to mean both "riparian" and "littoral." See, e.g., Utah State Rd.
Comm'n v. Hardy Salt Co., 26 Utah 2d 143, 145, 486 P.2d 391, 392 (1971); R.
BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 277 (3d ed. 1981). This note will use the
term "riparian" to include both riparian and littoral land.
5. "Glacio-isostatic uplift" was defined by the Honsinger court as the "gradual
rise of the earth's crust which occurs when the downward pressure exerted by a
glacial ice mass diminishes. The result at the shoreline is an emergence of land
which had been previously submerged." 642 P.2d at 1353 n.1. In technical terms,
glacio-isostatic uplift is a form of "isostasy." See generally 7 McGRAw-HILL ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 401 (1982), which defines "isostasy" as:
the principle that variations in the height of the earth's surface are com-
pensated by mass distributions beneath, leading to a state of purely hydro-
static pressure, independent of geographic position, at some moderate
depth beneath sea level.
A very important case of loading of the surface is that produced by
continental ice sheets. The additional weight of ice is compensated by a
downward deflection of the plate, outflow of asthenospheric material be-
neath, and the production of a surface bulge around the margins of the
sheet. Upon the disappearance of the ice sheet, the displaced material
slowly flows back, leading to a collapse of the bulge and the uplift of the
glaciated region.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 27-30, 33-37.
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II. INFIRMITIES IN THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
To reach its conclusion that glacio-isostatic uplift is a type of
reliction, the Honsinger court first classified land created by the
glacio-isostatic process as land formed by a "rise of the bed."
7 It
then stated that land formed by a "rise of the bed" is included within
the reliction doctrine, citing as support a Nebraska case, Ziemba v.
Zeller. 8 The Ziemba court, relying on an earlier Nebraska case,
Frank v. Smith, 9 defined reliction as "the gradual withdrawal of the
water from the land, by the lowering of its surface levelfrom any
cause." '0 Though not expressly stated, the Honsinger court must
have interpreted the phrase "from any cause" to include the with-
drawal of water by a "rise of the bed." This construction is inconsis-
tent with the meaning intended in the Ziemba and Frank decisions.
By using the language "from any cause," the Nebraska courts in-
tended to expand the traditional definition of reliction in order to
include recessions resulting from artificial means. I The Honsinger
court's reliance on Ziemba is, therefore, misplaced. The court cited
no other precedent for the proposition that a "rise of the bed" is
included in the definition of reliction. There is authority, however,
including prior statements by the Alaska Supreme Court, that relic-
tion is limited to a recession of the water and that it does not include
a "rise of the bed."'12
The Honsinger court also referred to Thompson, Commentaries
7. 642 P.2d at 1354.
8. 165 Neb. 419, 86 N.W.2d 190 (1957).
9. 138 Neb. 382, 293 N.W. 329 (1940).
10. 165 Neb. at 421-22, 86 N.W.2d at 193 (quoting Frank, 138 Neb. at 388, 293
N.W. at 333) (emphasis added).
11. In Ziemba, the issue addressed was whether one party could obtain owner-
ship to lands which accreted because of a dam. In order to emphasize that accretion
or reliction resulting from artificial means did not prevent riparian owners from
acquiring title, the court defined reliction to include land formed "from any cause."
165 Neb. at 421-22, 86 N.W.2d at 193. In Frank, the court used the language "from
any cause" in defining reliction in order to include land additions resulting from
unnatural obstructions placed in the river by third parties. 138 Neb. at 389, 293
N.W. at 333.
12. See Schafer v. Schnabel, 494 P.2d 802, 806 n.16 (Alaska 1972) (The doctrine
of "reliction involves an increase in the amount of exposed land beside a body of
water, but properly refers only to situations where the water itself has receded" (em-
phasis added)); see also United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 701 n.4 (9th Cir.
1978) (doctrine applicable to "land which becomes exposed by the gradual recession
of water"); United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp. 57, 62 (N.D. Iowa 1977) (reliction
is process "by which a gradual recession of water from a shoreline uncovers land");
Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Hardy Salt Co., 26 Utah 2d 143, 146, 486 P.2d 391, 392
(1971) (Reliction encompasses "land which emerges from beneath a body of water
caused by a recession of the waters.") (emphasis added). See generally 7 R. POWELL,
supra note 4, at 983.
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on the Modern Law of Real Property, as authority for its determina-
tion that a "rise of the bed" is a form of reliction.13 Thompson as-
serts that reliction results from the "emergence of existing soil either
through rise of the bed or through drying up of the water."14 Be-
cause no authorities are provided by Thompson to support this prop-
osition, the statement must be regarded as an overgeneralization.
In addition to these unconvincing authorities, the Honsinger
court advanced three justifications in support of its use of reliction
principles to determine ownership in lands formed by glacio-isostatic
uplift.15 The court's relegation of these reasons to a footnote is indic-
ative of their insignificant and unpersuasive value.' 6
The court first asserted that "no case has been located in which
the application of the law of reliction turned upon the nature of the
geophysical process which caused the new land to appear."' 7 In
other words, the court implied that the process by which relicted
land is created is unimportant in determining the land ownership
issue. Yet, the nature of the geophysical process is relevant insofar as
it forms the basis of policy reasons for deviating from or adhering to
the accretion and reliction doctrines. As the Washington Court of
Appeals stated in Strom v. Sheldon, 18 "[r]ules pertaining to accre-
tions, relictions, and avulsions should not be mechanically applied.
Rather, each case must be decided on its facts, and owners must be
afforded equitable treatment." Therefore, the fact that no case has
turned upon the particular nature of the geophysical process is not
unusual and should not be dispositive; rather, the relevant inquiry
should be whether any case has employed policy reasons in classify-
ing or not classifying certain natural or artificial land additions as
reliction. Had it focused on this inquiry, the court would have dis-
covered that many cases have used equitable principles to determine
ownership of relicted lands.' 9 Thus, the court's statement that no
13. 642 P.2d at 1354.
14. G. THOMPSON, supra note 2, § 2563, at 40-41 (emphasis added).
15. 642 P.2d at 1354 n.4.
16. Id
17. Id
18. 12 Wash. App. 66, 70-71, 527 P.2d 1382, 1385 (1974).
19. See, e.g., Strom, 12 Wash. App. at 70-71, 527 P.2d at 1385 (1974) (The court
was not concerned with whether the change in land was technically an avulsion,
accretion, or reliction. To determine in which party to vest ownership, the court
applied equitable principles. Only after considering and weighing the respective
interests of the parties did the court hold that the accretion and reliction rules
should be applied.); see also Turpin v. Watts, 607 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980) (landowner not entitled to land created by reliction if it was the result of an
artificial condition which was created by landowner); State v. Florida Nat'l Proper-
ties, 338 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976) (doctrine of reliction held inapplicable to situation in
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reliction case has been decided involving the nature of the geophysi-
cal process is misleading and unpersuasive.
The court next reasoned that the common law definition of re-
liction, "when the sea shrinks back below the usual watermark, '20
was developed prior to the glacio-isostatic uplift theory.21 The court
must have believed, therefore, that had the theory been known at the
time of Blackstone, it would have been incorporated into the doc-
trine of reliction. Upon reflection, however, it becomes apparent
that whether the common law would have included glacio-isostatic
uplift in the reliction doctrine is irrelevant. Instead, the inquiry
should focus on the policy reasons underlying the common law doc-
trine, and on whether these policy reasons support a classification of
glacio-isostatic uplift as a form of reliction. Blackstone noted that
the common law rule allowing the riparian owner the vested right to
accreted and relicted lands was deemed the most equitable solu-
tion.22 Determining if this is still the most equitable result depends
upon an analysis of interests different than those considered by
Blackstone. Today these interests demand that glacio-isostatic uplift
not be classified as a form of reliction because of Alaska's over-
whelming interest in safeguarding particularly sensitive shore
ecosystems.23
The court's third reason for treating glacio-isostatic uplift as re-
liction is the purported difficulty of judicially determining with ex-
actitude the physical process causing the land change.24 While there
may be some validity to this judicial caution, courts have considered
problems of scientific complexity before,25 and there is no reason
why the present context should present an insurmountable barrier.
Since the state has the burden of showing that the land change re-
which land was uncovered as result of deliberate drainage); accord Garrett v. State,
118 N.J. Super. 594, 289 A.2d 542 (Ch. Div. 1972).
For similar holdings in the accretion area, see infra note 31.
20. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262.
21. 642 P.2d at 1354 n.4.
22. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262.
23. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
24. 642 P.2d at 1354 n.4.
25. Compare the complexity of determining the exact geological process with
the complexity of deciding if a certain pesticide poses an unreasonable risk to soci-
ety. Although risk-benefit analysis in the pesticide area is fraught with uncertainty
and difficulty of interpretation and extrapolation, the courts have reviewed these
determinations with much success. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA,
548 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding Administrator's determination that
heptachlor and chlordane posed unreasonable risks); Environmental Defense Fund
v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (reviewing and reversing EPA Administra-
tor's determination that aldrin and dieldrin posed an unreasonable risk).
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suited from glacio-isostatic uplift,26 the court's function is solely to
analyze the evidence and to determine whether the state has met its
burden. This is not an unreasonable request to ask of the court; it is
its traditional function.
In summary, the court did not articulate convincing justifica-
tions for its finding that glacio-isostatic uplift is covered by the doc-
trine of reliction; nor did the court cite adequate judicial authority
for its holding. Conversely, there are persuasive policy reasons to
support a finding that glacio-isostatic uplift should not follow tradi-
tional rules of reliction, and that ownership of lands created by
glacio-isostatic uplift is best determined by an equitable balancing
approach.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY: ADOPTION OF AN EQUITABLE
BALANCING APPROACH
A. The Need for a Balancing Approach
Accretion and reliction are doctrines which do not allow suf-
ficient flexibility: newly created riparian land included in one of
these doctrines automatically vests in the private riparian owner,27 a
result which frustrates Alaska's need to manage its fragile resources.
In particular, Alaska has an important interest in effectively control-
ling its shorelines. Lands contiguous to water are particularly sensi-
tive ecosystems, disrupted by the slightest intrusion into their natural
cycles.28 To ensure that shorelines maintain their natural environ-
mental integrity, while providing the public with maximum aesthetic
and recreational opportunities, ownership of these areas should,
whenever possible, be held in public trust by the state.2 9 Wisconsin,
26. The burden is traditionally on the party claiming the benefit of the accretion
to show that the land was added by accretion. Department of Natural Resources v.
Pankratz, 538 P.2d 984, 989 (Alaska 1975); Schafer v. Schnabel, 494 P.2d 802, 807
(Alaska 1972). Analogizing this treatment to glacio-isostatic uplift, the burden of
proof will be on the party attempting to show that the land was added in this
manner.
27. See supra note 2.
28. See generally A. CAMPBELL, RIPARIAN VEGETATION IN OREGON'S WEST-
ERN CASCADE MOUNTAINS: COMPOSITION, BIOMASS, AND AUTUMN PHENOLOGY
(1979); J. CLARK, COASTAL ECOSYSTEMS (1974); Cooper, Ecological Consideration,
in COASTAL ZONE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (1971); B. GOPAL, WETLANDS: ECOL-
OGY AND MANAGEMENT (1982); 0. PiLKEY, HOW TO LIVE WITH AN ISLAND (1972);
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Proceedings of the National Wetland Protection Sympo-
sium (1977).
29. Pursuant to public trust principles, a state has the responsibility of protect-
ing and maintaining the trust property and of devoting the land to those uses which
will best serve the public interest. See generally Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892). If shoreland is not held in public trust, the necessary alter-
native means of managing shorelines is through regulation of private property.
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a state which also has an abundance of natural resources, serves as
an example of the importance of shorelines in the overall scheme of
resource management. In 1965, that state passed shoreline legisla-
tion requiring each municipality to develop rules which would "fur-
ther the maintenance of safe and healthful conditions; prevent and
control water pollution; protect spawning grounds, fish, and aquatic
life; control building sites, placement of structures, and land uses
and [p]reserve shore cover and natural beauty. ''30
Thus, in order to further the realistic objectives of Alaska, the
doctrines of accretion and reliction should not be extended beyond
their present application. It is neither recommendable nor plausible
for the judiciary to undertake a total revision of the law in this area;
to do so would, in essence, be equivalent to performing a legislative
function. Nevertheless, the courts can legitimately refuse to extend
traditional doctrines in the process of case-by-case decisionmaking.
Controversies that do not fall squarely within the accepted law of
accretion or reliction should be analyzed under a different approach:
instead of vesting title automatically in the riparian owner, the courts
should balance state and private interests to determine in whom title
should vest. The many exceptions to the accretion doctrine illustrate
that this would not be a revolutionary approach.31
There are two problems with a private regulatory scheme which militate against its
use. First, the regulation may impair the private landowner's use of land to such an
extent as to constitute a taking. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104 (1978). Second, enforcement of a regulation is more difficult when the
regulation applies to private lands than when it applies to public lands. Thus, in
order to facilitate effective management of shorelines, ownership of shorelands
should vest in the state whenever possible.
30. 1965 Wis. Laws Ch. 614, §§ 22(6), 42(1) (Mason) (codified at Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 59.971, 144.26 (1974)). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140 (1976).
31. On occasion the courts have limited the strict application of the accretion
rule when overriding considerations are present. For example, land added to one's
property by "avulsion," a sudden change in the course of a stream, does not alter a
legal boundary. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 327 (1973); Matthews
v. McGee, 358 F.2d 516, 517 (8th Cir. 1966). See generaly G. THOMPSON, supra
note 2, § 2561. The reasoning of the courts is that it would be unfair, because of the
suddenness and unforeseeability of the boundary change, to take land away from
the abutting landowner in order to vest title in the former riparian owner. See, e.g.,
Bonelli Cattle, 414 U.S. at 327.
Another limitation on the traditional application of the accretion doctrine is the
exception for "substantial accretions." In DeBoer v. United States, 653 F.2d 1313,
1315-16 (9th Cir. 1981), the court applied equitable principles, including unjust en-
richment, knowledge of accretion at time of entry, failure to occupy or use the ac-
creted lands, and denial of riparian access, in determining that "substantial
accretions" should not vest in the former riparian owner. The court emphasized
that such additions are not governed by traditional accretion rules. Accord, Smith v.
United States, 593 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1979); Wittmayer v. United States, 118
F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1941). But cf. United States v. 11,993.32 Acres of Land, 116
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B. Balancing State and Private Interests
As previously discussed, Alaska has an important interest in
managing its natural resources.32 Alaska's interest in controlling the
use of its shorelines cannot, however, be considered in a vacuum.
Rather, the interest must be balanced against the interest that the
former riparian owner has in retaining title to these newly formed
lands. Traditionally, three justifications have been adduced for vest-
ing ownership in the riparian owner. First, a continued access to the
water is necessary to preserve the riparian feature of one's land.33
Second, by obtaining ownership to the new lands, a former riparian
owner is being compensated for the risk of loss caused by erosion.34
Third, the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex, the law does not
concern itself with trifles, is applicable.35 Of these three reasons,
only the first has relevance in modem society. The recognized im-
portance of shorelines makes the third justification, de minimis non
curat lex, unconvincing. Even if the slow, imperceptible land addi-
tions can be regarded as in themselves trifling, the importance of
these newly created lands both to the state and to the private riparian
owner illustrates that, viewed as a whole, the controversy is not tri-
fling. Similarly, the compensation theory is not as justifiable as it
might appear: the fair market value of riparian land is discounted
F. Supp. 671, 676-78 (D.N.D. 1953) (rejecting the "substantial accretion" exception).
At least one jurisdiction does not allow accretions caused by artificial means to
vest in the former riparian owner. South Shore Land Co. v. Peterson, 230 Cal. App.
2d Supp. 628, 630, 41 Cal. Rptr. 277, 279 (Dep't Super. Ct. 1964) (no right to ac-
creted lands by former riparian owner when lands filled by artificial means); People
v. Hecker, 179 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 828, 837, 4 Cal. Rptr. 334, 343 (Dep't Super. Ct.
1960) (title to artificially caused accretions vests in the state, not the former riparian
owner). But the majority of jurisdictions do allow artificial accretions to vest in the
former riparian owner, provided the owner was not responsible for the accretion.
Bonelli Catile Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); Department of Natural Re-
sources v. Pankratz, 538 P.2d 984, 989 (Alaska 1975).
One court refused to hold that newly formed land resulted from accretion be-
cause of the unusual natural occurrence causing the land's creation. In State ex re.
Kobayashi v. Zinring, 566 P.2d 725 (Hawaii 1977), the Hawaii Supreme Court used
the process of the land change as a means to escape from the inflexible application
of the accretion doctrine. Instead of applying traditional accretion principles to
land added to Zimring's property from basaltic lava flows, the court employed a
balancing process to determine ownership. It concluded that the interests of the
state exceeded those of the former riparian owner; hence, title properly vested in the
state.
32. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973); Hughes v.
Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 293 (1967). See generally, G. THOMPSON, SUpra note 2,
§ 2560.
34. See County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 68 (1874);
Waynor v. Diboff, 9 Alaska 230, 232 (D. Alaska 1937).
35. See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262.
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by the probability that land will be lost by erosion. Accordingly, to
allow accreted land to vest in the former riparian owner would grant
him a windfall. 36 Hence, the only valid justification for applying the
accretion and reliction doctrines to land formed by glacio-isostatic
uplift is the landowner's desire to remain riparian. When land loses
its riparian nature, there can be a decrease in fair market value, a
deprivation of commercial opportunities, and a decline in recrea-
tional and aesthetic activities.37
Therefore, the optimal approach would have been for the
Alaska Supreme Court in Honsinger to have used the glacio-isostatic
uplift theory as an escape device in order to insert equitable consid-
erations into the determination of land ownership. The court would
then have balanced the state's interest in obtaining ownership to the
newly created lands against Honsinger's desire to retain the riparian
feature in part of his land.
C. Arguments Against the Use of an Equitable Balancing
Approach
There are basically two arguments against using a balancing ap-
proach in the accretion and reliction area. First, if the state is
granted title to the newly created lands, this may result in an uncon-
stitutional taking of the riparian feature of the private owner's land.
An unconstitutional taking may occur under either the United States
Constitution or the Alaska Constitution.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution reads, in
part: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 38 The Supreme Court's most recent discussion of
whether denial of riparian access amounts to a taking under the fifth
amendment is in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.39 Under Kaiser
Aetna, a denial of riparian access will not violate the fifth amend-
ment if the denial results from state or federal actions that improve
36. To illustrate this principle, consider the following hypothetical. Assume
there are two homes, identical in every respect except one: house A sits five feet
from a bank overlooking water, while house B is set back fifty feet from this bank.
Assume further that the cliff is known to have serious erosion problems. Although
identical, the houses will not have the same fair market value. House A will be
priced lower to take into account the probability that the bank will erode to such an
extent as to render the home useless. Thus, any risk of loss by erosion is a risk
which is calculated into the price of house A. Granting the owner of house A title in
newly accreted lands in essence grants him a windfall.
37. For a discussion of the qualities of being riparian, see Wernberg v. State,
516 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Alaska 1973).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
39. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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navigation.40 If, however, the deprivation is for a purpose other than
improving navigation, the question of whether there has been a tak-
ing will be decided on an individual basis.4'
Using a balancing approach to determine ownership in lands
uplifted by glacio-isostatic forces can result in private owners being
deprived of riparian access for nonnavigational purposes, and thus
raises possible taking problems under the Kaiser Aetna standard.
Yet these problems are more apparent than real. For example, to
determine if there has been a taking, a court will engage in an ad hoc
inquiry into several factors, including: economic impact on the pri-
vate owner of the governmental action, interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations, and importance to the public of the
governmental action.42 These factors are essentially the same con-
siderations that the court will examine to determine if glacio-isostatic
uplifted land should vest in the former riparian owner or the state.
Thus, a determination that land should vest in the state is, in essence,
a determination that the court would have found no taking had the
state legislature enacted legislation depriving the landowner of ripa-
rian access.
In addition to the United States Constitution, a taking may oc-
cur under the Alaska Constitution. The Alaska Constitution, article
VIII, section 16, provides: "No person shall be involuntarily
divested of his right to use of waters, his interest in lands, or im-
provements affecting either, except for a superior beneficial use or
public purpose and then only with just compensation and by opera-
tion of law.''43 "Use of waters" has been interpreted to include a
riparian right of access to water.44
In Wernberg v. State45 and Classen v. State,46 the Alaska
Supreme Court established standards to determine when an interfer-
ence with access to water, without compensation, will be deemed a
violation of section 16. In Wernberg, the construction of the Minne-
sota bypass totally prevented Wernberg's access to Cook Inlet from
Chester Creek.47 The court held that an uncompensated interference
40. Id at 178. See also United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967);
United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 628 (1961).
41. 444 U.S. at 178.
42. Id at 175; Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978); see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
43. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 16 (emphasis added).
44. Classen v. State, 621 P.2d 15, 16 (Alaska 1980); Grant v. State, 560 P.2d 36,
39 (Alaska 1977).
45. 516 P.2d 1191 (Alaska 1973).
46. 621 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1980).
47. 516 P.2d at 1193.
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which makes access to water impossible violates section 16.48 Clas-
sen, the court's most recent discussion of the issue, refused to extend
the Wernberg holding.49 In Classen, the court held that even though
Classen's use of the Chena River was impaired, thereby making his
commercial activities less profitable, the interference did not violate
section 16 because his access to the river was not totally impaired.50
Hence, provided that the interference does not result in a total pre-
clusion of access to water, the Classen case indicates that an impair-
ment of a private owner's riparian rights will be allowable under the
Alaska Constitution.
Thus, under the Wernberg and Classen rationales, a court which
engages in an equitable balancing approach can avoid section 16
problems by granting the former riparian owner a limited easement,
one that preserves the owner's access to water over the newly formed
glacio-isostatic uplifted lands.
The second possible problem with the use of a balancing ap-
proach in the accretion and reliction area is premised on an effi-
ciency rationale.5 1 If the justification for vesting ownership in the
state is that the land is more valuable to the public than it is to the
private landowner, then it is arguable that the state should pay the
private landowner the market value of the riparian interest. That is,
to ensure efficiency, a state should be forced to pay the fair market
value of the shoreland; if it is unwilling or unable to do so, then the
value of managing this resource should be deemed to be outweighed
by the value of the shoreland to the private owner.
In this area, it is submitted that requiring the state to compen-
sate the landowner is not a necessary device to ensure the efficient
utilization of resources. Judicial decisionmaking can serve the same
function. In weighing the competing state and private interests, the
court must examine the fair market value of each claim. A determi-
nation that title to glacio-isostatic uplifted land vests in the state is,
48. Id at 1201.
49. 621 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1980).
50. Id at 17 (the court concluded: "While Classen's property may have lost
some of its value as a result, not all such unfortunate consequences of public
projects are compensable.").
51. To illustrate economic efficiency theory, consider the following hypotheti-
cal. Assume X values a parcel of land at $100, Y at $120. The efficient result is for
the ultimate ownership to vest in the person who will receive the greatest utility
from the land. The most convenient method of judging utility is by the willingness
to pay. Thus, since Y values the land at $20 (that is, "willingness to pay") more
than X, Y will receive greater utility from the land. Thus, vesting ownership in Y
would be considered the efficient result. If, however, the value to society of having
the state retain ownership in the parcel is $130, then the efficient result would be to
vest ownership in the state, not Y. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
AND THE LAW (1977).
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in actuality, a finding that the land is more valuable if held in public
trust by the state than if held by a private individual. To require
compensation by the state for this land would thus serve no function.
Furthermore, a requirement of compensation would result in an un-
necessary transfer of state funds to private individuals.
It can thus be persuasively argued that the two primary objec-
tions to the balancing approach - one based on efficiency theory
and one on the United States and Alaska Constitutions - are not
barriers to its adoption.
IV. CONCLUSION
Alaska's current need to manage sensitive resources and ecosys-
tems demands that the rules of real property be characterized by
more flexible approaches. Flexibility is particularly necessary in the
accretion and reliction area. Though radical modification of this
area properly belongs to the state legislature, the court can influence
legislators and, in the interim, create flexibility in the area by not
extending the doctrines beyond their present common law
application.
Land added by glacio-isostatic uplift is not contained within
either the common law doctrines of reliction or accretion. Hence,
the process provides the quintessential opportunity in which to disre-
gard traditional accretion and reliction principles and to adopt an
equitable balancing approach which considers both the state's inter-
est in managing its resources and the private interest in retaining the
riparian feature of one's land. The Alaska Supreme Court in
Honsinger v. State failed to capitalize on this opportunity; instead,
the court classified glacio-isostatic uplift as a form of reliction. By so
doing the court has precluded, at least temporarily, the introduction
of needed flexibility into the rules of real property.
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